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Abstract 
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presence of a bubble price pattern, which we attribute to the strong destabilizing 
behaviour of fundamentalist speculators (e.g. hedge funds). The inclusion of the 
2009-2016 sub-period, in spite of sharp and unexpected fluctuations in oil prices 
and a significant increase in the influence of geopolitical factors, fails to invalidate 
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1. Introduction 
   
Between 2003 and 2016, oil prices witness unprecedented fluctuations that result in 
two major cycles, which straddle the 2009 global financial freeze. The first cycle 
begins in 2003, when prices – starting from a persistent low level (about 30 dollars 
per barrel on average) – increase continuously. A decline, which begins in mid-
2006, due mostly to the first reduction in two decades of oil demand by OECD 
countries, is followed, in the subsequent two years, by an extremely rapid and 
unexpected upswing variously attributed to shifting fundamentals, institutional 
changes and/or to financial bubble behaviour, upswing which is the main  issue of 
this paper. 
In more detail, Master (2008) and Sari et al. (2012), among others, attribute it  to 
the influx of institutional investors in commodity markets that is to the 
financialization of the sector (on this see also Tang and Xiong 2012). Hamilton 
(2009) and Kesicki, on the other hand, (2010) relate it to fundamental variables 
(weak dollar combined with low elasticity of supply). More recently, financial herd 
behavior has emerged as a possible interpretation of this phenomenon, starting a 
new strand in the literature on the relative importance of financial determinants in 
commodity pricing, which Demirer et al. (2015) and Boyd et al. (2018) summarize. 
Regarding explanations based on bubble detection, a vast and growing strand in the 
literature has focused on the so-called log-period power law (LPPL) model set out by 
Sornette and Johansen (1997) and applied to oil pricing by Sornette et al. (2009) 
and Zhang and Yao (2016).  
With the world economy plunged in the Great Recession and with major 
technological innovations (shale oil in particular) and geopolitical turmoil (Middle-
East conflicts, Saudi Arabia energy policy shifts) affecting the global oil industry, a 
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proper identification of oil price drivers, during the second cycle (2009 – 2016), 
becomes more difficult.1 Indeed the market witnesses unprecedented – and 
confusing - changes in demand and supply factors, leaving it open to question, 
whether financial (cum bubble) drivers play a relevant role throughout the 2003 – 
2016 period and, second, how alterations in standard trading patterns brought 
about the large price swings observed in the 2003-2009 period.  
Recent empirical studies test the relevance of financial drivers, using the 
Commitment of Traders Futures Only report data in order to quantify, in various 
ways, financial speculative pressure (see, among others, Kim, 2015, and Gogolin 
and Kearney, 2016, and the literature quoted therein). In this paper, we address 
this problem building a model, which incorporates agents moved by purely financial 
considerations and market sentiment alongside traditional market players.2 This 
model is consistent with the LPLL approach to the detection of bubbles and 
complements it by disentangling the various drivers of super-exponential behaviour 
and of log-periodic price dynamics oscillation. 
In a highly innovative article, Frankel and Froot (1986) underlined the importance of 
the interaction between standard financial market operators, such as chartists (or 
noise traders) and fundamentalist speculators, as a driver of an endogenous non-
linear law of motion in foreign exchange rate dynamics. In the same vein, a large 
and booming literature on commodity/oil pricing, building on heterogeneous agent 
models (HAM) by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) and Westerhoff (2004), among 
many others, posited that agents react to differing information sets, resulting in 
market prices, which are weighted averages of their heterogeneous reactions.  
                                                          
1 On the oil supply and price stabilization policy of Saudi Arabia see Nakov and Nuño (2011). See 
Santabárbara (2017) for details on the November 2014 and December 2015 OPEC oil supply policy 
decisions. For an interpretation of the 2014 oil price slump, which emphasizes the role of demand 
factors, see Baumeister and Kilian (2015). 
2 On this line, see the alternative of Deeney et al. (2015) who introduce a financial “sentiment index”, 
built along the lines of Baker and Wurgler (2006) in an equity market context. 
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Drawing inspiration from Westerhoff and Reitz (2005), Reitz and Westerhoff (2007) 
and Tokic (2011), we build a model in which three categories of agents interact: 
noise traders, fundamentalist speculators and hedgers. Noise traders react to past 
price changes and can either stabilize or destabilize the market, according to 
whether they behave as contrarians (negative feedback traders) or trend followers 
(positive feedback traders). Fundamentalist speculators, among whom we include 
financial agents, respond to deviations of market returns from equilibrium. In this 
case, a destabilizing behavior is due to lack of confidence in the mean-reverting 
nature of market prices. Finally, we account for the presence of industry investors, 
producers and consumers, by including them in the category of hedgers who reduce 
risk by using futures contracts. In this line, our model combines typical financial 
market behavior with dynamic hedging of commodity contracts.3   
This paper combines the different strands in the literature reviewed above, 
introducing some relevant innovations. Based on the Zhou-Sornette (2009) and on 
the Phillips et al. (2011) methodologies, we identify the presence of a bubble 
between January 2007 and February 2009. Our model allows us to attribute the 
former to shifts in the behavior of three categories of agents: feedback traders, 
fundamentalists and hedgers. This greatly expands the dynamics of the standard 
HAM pricing paradigm. We impose no a priori restrictions on the signs of the 
parameters of the futures returns relationship and stabilizing or destabilizing 
reactions of economic agents are allowed for. In the same way, no restrictions are 
imposed on the sign of the speed of adjustment coefficient in the logistic functions, 
which model the entry in (exit from) the market of these agents according to their 
trust in the reliability of market pricing. We also introduce two indicators to control 
for currency and financial market conditions, finding that changes in weighted US 
                                                          
3
 Along these lines, Kao et al. (2016) explicitly introduce contrarians alongside positive 
feedback traders and fundamentalists. 
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dollar exchange rate and the VIX (VOX) index have a statistically significant impact 
on oil pricing patterns. More specifically, we find a negative correlation between the 
USD and oil prices, a finding which confirms well-known stylized facts about the oil 
market. We also find negative correlation between oil prices and the VOX index, 
which we take as indicative of a depressing effect of business uncertainty on oil 
price quotations.    
The main results read as follows. The bubble affects all categories of agents, in 
some cases reinforcing their behavior (as observed over the whole sample period) in 
other cases altering it. More specifically, the bubble tends to bring about a 
stabilizing reaction from hedgers and chartists (acting as contrarians) and to 
reinforce the market destabilizing behaviour of fundamentalists. These results apply 
to the entire sample (2003 – 2016) and are strongly corroborated over the 2003-
2009 subset.    
By modelling both the one-month and the three-month to expiry futures contracts, 
based on weekly data, we test whether contract maturity affects these patterns. As 
expected, in periods of turmoil and rising uncertainty, we find evidence of short-
termism by rational financial agents, as the absolute values of the coefficients tend 
to be larger in actual value in the case of the one-month contract.  
This research is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the theoretical and 
empirical characteristics of our three-agent model. Section 3 sets forth the empirical 
estimates over the periods. Section 4, concludes the paper and provides an 
economic and financial interpretation of the observed oil futures price gyrations.    
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2. The model 
 
2.1 Theoretical considerations 
Hedging transactions are intended to reduce the risk of unwanted future cash price 
changes.  We define the return of cash position in the oil market as 𝑟𝑐𝑡 = ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑡 = ∆𝑐𝑡  
where 𝐶𝑡 is the cash (spot) oil price. In the same way, the return of futures positions 
is 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐹𝑡 = ∆𝑓𝑡, where 𝐹𝑡 is the price of the corresponding futures contract. An 
investor who takes short (long) position of one unit in the oil cash market will hedge 
by taking a long (short) position of 𝛽 in the futures market. This hedge ratio can be 
regarded as the fraction of the short (long) position that is covered by futures 
purchases (sales). 
Prices are set in an order-driven market. Every period traders revise their long/short 
positions; price changes from t to t+1 are a function of their excess demands and 
can be parameterized by the following log-linear function 
 
𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼(𝐷𝑡
𝐶 + 𝐷𝑡
𝐹 + 𝐷𝑡
𝐻) + 𝑒𝑡+1   (1) 
 
where α is a positive market reaction coefficient and 𝐷𝑡
𝐶 , 𝐷𝑡
𝐹 and 𝐷𝑡
𝐻 denote the 
demand of chartists (feedback traders), fundamentalists and hedgers. The residual 
1te  accounts for additional factors that may impact on prices.  The demand of 
feedback traders at time t is given by 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐶 = 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 (𝑓𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡−1) + 𝑎1
∗𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 + 𝑎1
∗∗𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡         (2) 
 
Coefficient 1a  is positive as feedback traders expect the existing price trend to 
persist in the subsequent time period. They will buy the contract if ∆𝑓𝑡 is positive 
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and sell it if ∆𝑓𝑡 is negative.
4 Their overall impact is nonlinear and given by 𝑎1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 is assumed to measure the fraction of the set of feedback traders entering 
the market at time t. This fraction depends upon market conditions and is 
parameterized by the following logistic function  
 
𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐶 (|𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2⁄ )}]
−1
             𝑖 = 0,1, … , 𝑙    (3) 
 
N is the normal (equilibrium) return of the oil futures contract, which is defined as 
the following n-periods moving average of current and past commodity futures 
returns 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑘 𝑛⁄
𝑛−1
𝑘=0 .  We assume, in this way, that oil futures returns are the 
algebraic sum of two stochastic components: an equilibrium level N and a 
temporary deviation (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖).  The value of the delay parameter i is determined 
empirically as it depends upon the physical and institutional characteristics of WTI 
oil pricing.  The component |𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2     ⁄ is a signal to noise ratio. The larger the 
deviation of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖 from N , the stronger the perception of market disequilibrium and 
the larger the fraction of feedback traders that will post orders on the market. The 
denominator, 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖
2 , is an index of futures price variability. It accounts for the impact 
of risk. A higher (lower) risk associated with higher (lower) price volatility will 
reduce (increase), for a given perception of market disequilibrium, the willingness of 
speculators to enter the market. The term 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶   can take any value in the [0;1] 
interval depending on the sign of coefficient  𝛾𝐶 as |𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖| ranges from 0 
(when   𝑁 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖) to  . Large deviations of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑖 from normal value will bring about 
a decline (increase) in the number of chartists when 𝛾𝐶 is negative (positive). The 
absolute value of 𝛾𝐶 matters too. The higher the synchronization of traders’ reaction 
to price deviations from their normal level (a symptom of herding behaviour), the 
                                                          
4 If a1 is negative, negative feedback traders/contrarians stabilize the market. 
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larger is the value of 𝛾𝐶. On the contrary, a low absolute value of this coefficient will 
reflect idiosyncratic reactions of traders to price disequilibria, possibly due to 
differing degrees of risk aversion.  
The impact of the rate of change of the USD nominal trade weighted exchange rate 
on the behaviour of chartists is measured by coefficient 𝑎1
∗. Its sign is expected to be 
negative, as a USD appreciation will lead to a reduction in dollar denominated oil 
prices and vice-versa for a USD depreciation. A shift in the VOX index too will affect 
the demand of chartists. Its impact on oil prices is measured by coefficient 𝑎1
∗∗. A 
negative sign means that an increase (decrease) in financial uncertainty will bring 
about a decrease (increase) in oil prices. This coefficient is assumed to account for 
the impact of the assessment of financial risk outlook on chartists. As pointed out by 
Zhang et al. (2017), free movements of investment funds tend to swarm in and out 
of the oil market. An increase in stock market uncertainty will bring about an 
outflow of funds from oil contracts and therefore produce a decline in their price.            
Alongside feedback traders, we posit the existence of professional (institutional) 
investors, labelled here fundamentalists, who exploit their oil market expertise for 
portfolio diversification purposes. As such, their behaviour is influenced by both 
futures and cash returns, as discussed below. Their demand of futures contracts at 
time t is given by 
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐹 = 𝑎2𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑎2
∗𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 + 𝑎2
∗∗𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡 (4) 
 
Fundamentalists react to deviation of the futures return from its equilibrium value N 
as defined above. The coefficient 𝑎2 indicates how fundamentalists’ beliefs about 
market prices affect their behaviour. If the coefficient 𝑎2 takes on a positive value, 
this indicates that the majority of fundamentalists believes that the price will revert 
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to its equilibrium value. This will lead them to buy if 𝑁 > 𝑟𝑓𝑡 and to sell in the 
opposite case. If the coefficient 𝑎2  takes on a negative value, fundamentalists, 
disbelieving in the mean-reverting nature of the price, will sell if 𝑁 > 𝑟𝑓𝑡 and buy in 
the opposite case.5 In all cases, empirical findings suggest that fundamentalists 
enter or exit the market depending on their perception of oil price misalignment in 
the spot market, whereas chartists respond to futures prices as seen above. 
Fundamentalists base their investment strategies on more sophisticated scenarios, 
which necessarily include the evaluation of cash oil markets and of their underlying 
fundamental drivers. Consequently, we model the transition function 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹 as follows   
 
𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐹 (|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2⁄ )}]
−1
         𝑗 = 0,1, … , 𝑝   (5) 
 
Where M is the normal (equilibrium) return of oil cash contracts, which is defined as 
the following m-periods moving average of current and past cash oil returns 
𝑀 = ∑ 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑘 𝑚⁄
𝑚−1
𝑘=0 .
6  The value of the delay parameter j is determined empirically. The 
component |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗
2     ⁄ is a signal to noise ratio, synthesizing the dynamics of 
the oil spot market. Here too, the term 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹   can take any value in the [0; 1] interval 
depending on the sign of coefficient 𝛾𝐹 as |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗| ranges from 0 (when   𝑀 = 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗) 
to  . Large deviations of 𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑗 from normal value will bring about a decline (an 
increase) in the number of fundamentalists when 𝛾𝐹 is negative (positive). Here too 
oil market participants are assumed to be affected by USD dollar exchange rate 
shifts and by changes in stock market price uncertainty, as quantified by shifts in 
the VOX implied volatility S&P100 index. The corresponding impacts on futures oil 
prices are measured by coefficients 𝑎2
∗ and 𝑎2
∗∗ . 
                                                          
5
 See Chia et al. (2014). 
6 In our empirical analysis it is assumed that m = n = 12.  
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Hedgers base their decisions on the return of the hedging position and on its 
variance. As equation (6) indicates, the return to the hedging position 𝑟𝐻𝑡 is a linear 
combination of the returns of the cash and futures prices  
 
𝑟𝐻𝑡 = 𝑟𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽𝑟𝑓𝑡=(𝑐𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡−1) − 𝛽(𝑓𝑡 − 𝑓𝑡−1)  (6) 
 
Where 𝛽 is the hedging ratio. 
The variance of the portfolio revenue by unit of product is obtained: 
 
𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝛽2𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 − 2𝛽𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡     (7) 
 
Where 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  is the variance of the cash return, 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2  the variance of the futures return,  
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the linear correlation coefficient between the two returns and is equal to 
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡⁄ 𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡). The optimum hedge ratio 𝛽
∗is derived from the first order condition 
of the hedging position variance minimization and reads as  
 
𝛽∗ =
𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2    (8) 
 
Therefore, the optimum hedge ratio depends on the covariance between the 
changes in futures and cash prices and on the variance of the futures price changes. 
The hedging model is extended by introducing a dynamic component. The 
performance of a portfolio is measured by its variance reduction with respect to the 
optimal percentage of hedging. Substituting 𝛽∗ in equation (7), we obtain  
 
𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 −
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡)
2
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 (1 − 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 )    (9) 
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Equation (10) describes the demand of futures contracts of a trader wishing to 
minimize the variance of her optimally hedged position  
 
𝐷𝑡
𝐻 = 𝑎3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2 +  𝑎3
∗𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 + 𝑎3
∗∗𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡    (10) 
 
An increase in the minimum portfolio variance (9) may be due to a rise in the 
variability of cash price changes and/or to a decrease in the correlation between the 
cash and futures returns. The overall impact of hedgers’ trading is nonlinear and 
given by 𝑎3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  where 𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  is assumed to measure the fraction of the set of hedgers 
entering the market at time t, fraction which, in turn, will depend upon market 
conditions. The structure of the hedgers transition function is analogous to that, 
which governs the behavior of fundamentalists. Indeed both categories of agents 
respond to deviations of cash prices from their perceived equilibrium value M, even 
if with different speeds and obviously with different goals. Based on these 
considerations, the transition function 𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻  is parameterized by the following logistic 
function, whose properties mirror those of equation (5) 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝐻(|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−ℎ| 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡−ℎ
2⁄ )}]
−1
         ℎ = 0,1, … , 𝑘   (11) 
 
The impact on hedgers’ futures demand of the USD exchange rate and of stock 
market uncertainty are quantified by coefficients  𝑎3
∗ and 𝑎3
∗∗ . 
Substituting equations (2), (4) and (10) in equation (1) we have the following 
futures prices relationship 
𝑟𝑓𝑡+1 = 𝜃1𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐶 𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐹(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝜃3𝑆ℎ𝑡
𝐻 (𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 −
(𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡)
2
𝜎𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 ) +  𝜃4𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑓𝑡+1    (12) 
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Where 𝜃1 = 𝛼𝑎1 , 𝜃2 = 𝛼𝑎2, 𝜃3 = 𝛼𝑎3, 𝜃4 = 𝛼(𝑎1
∗ + 𝑎2
∗ + 𝑎3
∗) and 𝜃5 = 𝛼(𝑎1
∗∗ + 𝑎2
∗∗ + 𝑎3
∗∗) 
 
Equation (12) relates futures returns to their previous period values, to the 
deviation of these values from their long run equilibrium N, and to the past 
variability of the optimally hedged positions of oil traders and oil producers. 
Economic theory posits that spot and futures prices are jointly determined for any 
given commodity (Stein 1961). Our investigation thus includes two equations 
accounting, respectively, for the behavior of spot and futures price returns together 
with their covariance.  The conditional mean equation for 𝑟𝑐𝑡 is modelled as an error 
correction relationship (Equation 13), where spot prices adjust to futures prices, 
which play the price discovery role. In the long run, indeed, a cointegration 
relationship between cash and futures prices holds and plays the role of attractor for 
the short-run cash price adjustments. 
 
𝑟𝑐𝑡+1 = 𝑏0 + ∑ 𝑏1z𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑧
𝑛
𝑧=0 + ∑ 𝑏2w𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑤
𝑚
𝑤=0 + 𝜃(𝑐𝑡 − 𝜆𝑓𝑡) + 𝑒𝑐𝑡+1   (13) 
 
2.2. The empirical model 
 
     
Futures and cash price rates of return are conditionally heteroskedastic when data 
are sampled with a weekly frequency – as we do in this paper – and a GARCH 
approach is used to model the second moments that enter equation (12). Equation 
(14), the empirical counterpart of equation (13) above, parameterizes the 
conditional mean of the cash returns whereas equation (15), the counterpart of 
equation (12), illustrates futures pricing by hedgers and speculators.  
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We adapt the model set out above to the bubble-like environment, by including a 
slope dummy 𝐷𝐵𝑡   in equation (15), which is equal to 1 over the bubble period and 0 
otherwise, enabling us to assess the different reaction of the three categories of 
agents. We identify the bubble period using the approaches of Zhou and Sornette 
(2009) and of Phillips et al. (2011) and find that it spans the 2007-2009 years as 
we discuss in more detail in Section 3. 
 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑑0 + ∑ 𝑑cz𝑟𝑐𝑡−𝑧
𝑛
𝑧=1 + ∑ 𝑑fw𝑟𝑓𝑡−𝑤
𝑚
𝑤=1 + 𝜁(𝑓𝑡−1 − 𝜆0 − 𝜆1𝑐𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑐𝑡   (14) 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 =
𝑔0 + (𝑔1 + 𝑏1𝐷𝐵𝑡−1)𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1 + (𝑔2 + 𝑏2𝐷𝐵𝑡−1)𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹 (𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1) + (𝑔3 + 𝑏3𝐷𝐵𝑡−1)𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻 ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 +
𝑔4𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡−1 + 𝑔5𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑓𝑡    (15) 
𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
𝐶 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐶 (|𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖| ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖
2⁄ )}]
−1
  (16) 
𝑆𝑗𝑡−1
𝐹 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾𝐹 (|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑗| ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑗
2⁄ )}]
−1
 (17) 
𝑆ℎ𝑡−1
𝐻 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝐻(|𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−ℎ| ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−ℎ
2⁄ )}]
−1
 (18) 
𝜈𝑡 = [
𝜈𝑐𝑡
𝜈𝑓𝑡
]   (19) 
𝜈𝑡|Ω𝑡−1~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡)  (20) 
𝐻𝑡 = ∆𝑡𝑅∆𝑡    (21) 
𝑅 = [
1 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 1
]   (22)     ∆𝑡= [
ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡 0
0 ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
]  (22’)  
ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑐 + 𝛼𝑐𝜈𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2     (23)      ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑓 + 𝛼𝑓𝜈𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑓ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2   (23’) 
ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 = (ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1
2 −
(ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡−1𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)
2
ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡−1
2 )  (24) 
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Our empirical model allows for a complex characterization of the interaction among 
different categories of economic agents, who react to deviations of market prices 
from their equilibrium values, in ways, which can be stabilizing or destabilizing.  
If 𝑔1 is positive (negative), chartists (contrarians) destabilize (stabilize) the market, 
acting as positive (negative) feedback traders.7 If 𝛾 (𝛾𝐶 in equation (16)) is positive 
(negative), the relative number of feedback traders, present in the market, grows 
(declines) with the deviation of 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖  from its moving average value 𝑁.  
Turning to fundamentalist speculators, the negative value of 𝑔2 deserves specific 
comment. Fundamentalists may indeed believe that the persistence in the 
misalignment between the equilibrium and the current rate of return on futures 
contracts will last for some time and persist to buy (sell) if  𝑟𝑓𝑡 > 𝑁  (𝑟𝑓𝑡 < 𝑁). This is a 
symptom of the failure of the price signaling process during periods of turbulence 
and is consistent with fundamentalists destabilizing the market, their traditional 
stabilizing behaviour being associated with a positive value of 𝑔2. As for the negative 
sign of 𝛾 (𝛾𝐹 in Equation (17)), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain it by the wariness 
of fundamentalists to enter the market if trades based on their own forecasts turn 
out to be persistently incorrect. In this case, a growing disequilibrium between the 
cash return and its equilibrium value will bring about a decline in the number of 
fundamentalists active in the market.  
Coming to hedgers, the following considerations apply. As Cifarelli (2013, p.161) 
explains, an increase in 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  can be produced either by an increase or a decrease in 
crude oil prices. As Equation (9) indicates the hedged portfolio variance 𝜎𝑟𝐻𝑡
2  depends 
on the variance of cash prices 𝜎𝑟𝑐𝑡
2  and on the squared correlation coefficient between 
cash and futures prices 𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡
2 . Whenever – as is the case in our estimates – 
correlation between the two prices is stable over time, hedgers will react to changes 
                                                          
7 The standard justification for the presence of contrarians is that some feedback traders may believe 
that prices have overshot a reasonable equilibrium value (Wan and Kao, 2009). 
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in cash prices only. Coefficient 𝑔3 is expected to be negative if in the previous 
period(s) the cash price rate of change is positive and positive if in the previous 
period(s) the cash price rate of change is negative. Long positions in commodities 
(by producers) are associated with short positions in futures contracts, whereas 
short positions in commodities (by e.g. traders or consumers) are associated with 
long positions in futures contracts. If the commodity cash price rises (falls), the 
producer is likely, in the subsequent time period, to increase (reduce) his planned 
future sales. In order to hedge against future spot price declines he is going to raise 
(decrease) his hedging position by selling more (less) futures contracts. The futures 
price will fall (rise) and the coefficient of the hedged position variability 𝑔3 will be 
negative (positive). The behavior of either traders or consumers causes the same 
sign shifts. If the commodity price declines (rises) traders will face, in the following 
period, an increase (decrease) in demand and increase (reduce) their short 
positions commitments in the cash market, and in order to hedge against futures 
price rises, will raise (cut) their long positions in the futures market bringing about a 
futures price increase (decrease).  
  
3. Empirical results 
 
The paper uses weekly data in order to measure the impact of the financial crisis on 
the dynamics of futures oil pricing. Our sample spans the time interval from 2 
January 2003 to 12 January 2016 and includes two major cycles, terminated by 
abrupt downswings in 2009 and in 2015. We analyze in this paper futures oil price 
dynamics over the full sample and in order to investigate its peculiar properties, 
over the highly controversial 2003-2009 time period. The oil spot price Ct is the WTI 
spot price FOB (US dollars per barrel), the futures oil price Ft is provided by the EIA 
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database.8 Figure 1 exhibits the series themselves and summary statistics of the 
rates of returns over the full sample and the second sub-sample are set out in Table 
1. Figure 1 depicts oil cash and futures prices in levels (left-hand panels) and in first 
log-differences (right-hand panels). Price levels provide visual insights into the 
bubble-like price behaviour, which our analysis tries to explain. Leaving out the 
“Great Moderation”, our sample period is characterized – from 2005 to mid 2008 - 
by a positive trend, interrupted by a sharp spike, followed by an equally outsized 
downswing.  
As pointed out in the recent literature, a defining characteristic of bubble dynamics 
is the super-exponential behavior of prices. In order to detect it, we perform both 
the D-test of Zhou and Sornette (2009) and the SADF (supremum right-tail ADF) 
bubble test of Phillips et al. (2011).9 We find that our series conform with this 
behaviour from January 2007 to July 2008. The tests we are using here indentify 
the shorter super-exponential price upswing, which ends in June 2008, i.e. the first 
part of the bubble only. In the empirical estimates we use the entire bubble, which 
includes also the 2008-2009 downswing, in our dummy time interval. The bubble 
dummy 𝐷𝐵𝑡, therefore, takes a value of 1 over the longer  12 January 2007 - 13 
February 2009 time interval. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Futures contract 1 expires on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month 
preceding the delivery month. If the 25th calendar day of the month is a non-business day, trading 
ceases on the 3rd business day prior to the business day preceding the 25th calendar day. Contract 3 
corresponds to the second successive delivery month following contract 1.  
9 The test results are set out in the appendix. 
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Figure 1. Oil spot and futures prices and rates of return  
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differences are always stationary, as shown by ADF test statistics, non-normally 
distributed and affected by nonlinearities.  
 
        
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 02/01/2003 – 12/01/2016 02/01/2003 – 29/12/2009 
 Spot price return 
𝑟𝑐𝑡  
Futures contract 
1 return 𝑟𝑓1𝑡 
Futures contract 
3 return 𝑟𝑓3𝑡 
Spot price return 
𝑟𝑐𝑡  
Futures contract 
1 return 𝑟𝑓1𝑡 
 
Futures contract 
3 return 𝑟𝑓3𝑡 
Mean 0.0001 0.0015 0.0003 0.0024 
 
 0.0024 
 
 0.0026 
 
Std. dev. 0.0424 0.0402 0.0365 0.0479 
 
 0.0446 
 
 0.0398 
 
Skewness -0.4680 -0.4635 -0.3939 -0.6728 
 
-0.6638 
 
-0.5565 
 
Kurtosis 8.6338 4.6288 4.3949 8.2117 
 
 4.2909 
 
 3.9708 
 
JB 751.3448 
[0.000] 
99.5258 
[0.000] 
72.7132 
[0.000] 
435.7910 
[0.000] 
 51.5757 
[0.000] 
 32.8132 
[0.000] 
AR1 16.753 
[0.000] 
14.645 
[0.000] 
29.954 
 
[0.000] 
      7.2194 
[0.007] 
         14.472 
[0.000] 
      15.861 
[0.000] 
AR5 28.214 
[0.000] 
22.022 
[0.000] 
       39.545 
[0.000] 
  17.941 
[0.003] 
      21.522 
[0.001] 
23.113 
[0.000] 
ARCH1 115.270 
[0.000] 
       63.395 
[0.000] 
37.663 
[0.000] 
  69.367 
[0.000] 
 
      45.072 
      [0.000] 
 
29.491 
[0.000] 
ARCH5 267.560 
[0.000] 
     213.470 
[0.000] 
       114.70 
0[0.000] 
    159.750 
[0.000] 
 
      162.00 
         [0.000] 
94.582 
[0.000] 
ADF 
(c, n) 
-22.2835 
(no c, 1) 
[0.000] 
-12.855 
(no c, 2) 
[0.000] 
-12.892 
(no c, 2) 
[0.000] 
-9.189 
(no c, 2) 
[0.000] 
       -15.426 
       (no c, 0) 
        [0.000] 
 
-15.253 
(no c, 0) 
[0.000] 
 
BDS2    8.1306                               
[0.000]  
 
 8.3545 
[0.000] 
6.8262 
[0.000] 
5.9710 
[0.000] 
 6.5189 
[0.000] 
 4.24045 
[0.000] 
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th 
order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the 
squared time series; ADF(c, n): Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test statistic, with a constant term and nth order 
autoregressive component; BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the time series, 
filtered for a first order autoregressive structure, is independently and identically distributed. 
 
Indeed, the BDS test statistics of Brock et al. (1987) strongly reject, with 
embedding dimension 2, the null hypothesis that the rates of returns, filtered for 
first order serial dependence are iid. (Analogous results are obtained for the 
unfiltered returns, with embedding dimensions varying from 2 to 6). From a 
qualitative point of view, the properties of the data, which span the sub-sample 
(2003-2009), are analogous to the full sample ones.  
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3.1 Empirical analysis over the full sample  
 
The full sample estimates (02/01/2003 – 12/01/2016) of the model can be found in 
Table 2. The parameterization of equation (15) is justified by the strategy set out in 
Teräsvirta (1994). At first, the lag of the autoregressive futures log difference is 
selected using the Akaike Information Criterion: a one-week lag provides the best 
fit. A test of linearity against the non-linear parameterization of equation (15) is 
performed following the procedure of Luukkonen at al. (1988), as modified by Wan 
and Kao (2009). The transition functions (16), (17) and (18) are replaced in 
equation (15) by a third order Taylor series approximation. The following auxiliary 
equation is estimated   
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑟𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝜋2𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖 + 𝜋3𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖
2 + 𝜋4𝑟𝑓𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1−𝑖
3 + 
+𝜇1(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1) + 𝜇2(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗 + 𝜇3(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗
2 + 𝜇4(𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1)𝑥𝑡−1−𝑗
3 + 
+𝛿1ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿2ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ + 𝛿3ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ
2 + 𝛿4ℎ𝑟𝐻𝑡−1
2 𝑥𝑡−1−ℎ
3  
+𝜏1𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷,𝑡−1 + 𝜏2𝐷𝑉𝑂𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡  
where,     𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝑘 =  |𝑀 − 𝑟𝑐𝑡−1−𝑘|,    𝑘 =  𝑗, ℎ    and   𝑦𝑡−𝑖 =  |𝑁 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡−1−𝑖| 
 
We test linearity against STAR modeling - for various values of i, j and h - 
performing LM tests of the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜋2 =  𝜋3 =  𝜋4 = 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = 𝜇4 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 =
𝛿4 = 0.  We have also tested linearity against STAR modeling for chartists, 
fundamentalists and hedgers in isolation. That is, we have performed the following 
LM tests of the null hypotheses 𝐻0𝐶: 𝜋2 =  𝜋3 =  𝜋4 = 0; 𝐻0𝐹: 𝜇2 = 𝜇3 = 𝜇4 = 0;  and 𝐻0𝐻: 
𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 0. For the values of the delay parameters of the first row of Tables 2 
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and 3, the Teräsvirta Non-linearity Test (TNT) statistics uniformly reject 𝐻0, 𝐻0𝐶 and 
𝐻0𝐻 in the case of the full-sample estimates and fail to reject 𝐻0𝐹 only, in the case of 
fundamentalists operating with the three month futures contract. Our non-linear 
parameterization is thus convincingly justified by the data and the time-varying 
fractions of chartists, fundamentalists and hedgers in equation (15) are 
parameterized using equations (16), (17) and (18).10 
The overall quality of fit of the model is satisfactory. The estimated parameters are 
significantly different from zero and our GARCH model captures the conditional 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals.11 The usual misspecification tests indicate that 
the standardized residuals 𝜂𝑡 are always well behaved; for each system 𝐸[𝜂𝑡] = 0,  
𝐸[𝜂𝑡
2] = 1  and 𝜂𝑡
2 is serially uncorrelated. The BDS2 tests, moreover, fail to reject the 
null that the standardized residuals are iid. The nonlinearities detected in the return 
time series of Table 1 are filtered away by the model.  
The main results emerging from the estimates reported on Table 2 may be 
summarized as follows. First, we find evidence that both feedback traders and 
fundamentalists exert a price destabilizing effect over the whole sample, captured 
by the coefficients 𝑔1 and 𝑔2, in the case of Fut-1 and also in the case of Fut-3 as far 
as feedback traders are concerned. The bubble exacerbates the destabilizing 
behaviour of fundamentalists (i.e. hedge funds), as the highly significant negative 
value of coefficient 𝑏2 indicates, while dampening the effect of feedback trading, as 
the negative sign of the coefficient 𝑏1 suggests. In the same way, during the bubble 
and particularly for the Fut-1 contract, hedgers stabilize the market as we explain in 
detail at the end of section 2. Overall, our estimates indicate that market 
                                                          
10
 The Taylor procedure allows us to reject the alternative ESTAR parameterization of the transition 
function. For the sake of parsimony these tests are not reported here. It should be noticed that 
rejection of the 𝐻0𝐶 , 𝐻0𝐹  and 𝐻0𝐻 hypotheses implies also the rejection of the hypotheses that chartists, 
fundamentalists and hedgers fail to affect the behavior of the futures contracts rates of change, 
justifying, in this way, the three-agent model parameterization of our paper. 
11 The t-ratios reported in the tables are based on the robust quasi-maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
20 
 
participants trust price signals coming from the 3-month compartment, while not 
relying in the same way on the 1-month contract.  
Table 2. Full sample estimates: 02/01/2003 – 12/01/2016  
Fut1 Fut3 
m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=2, h=8 m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=1, h=11 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡  𝑟𝑓𝑡 
𝑑0 1.079 
(51.146) 
𝑔0 0.232 
(10.512) 
  𝑑0 0.242     
(13.535)   
𝑔0 0.175      
(9.990)   
  
𝑑c1 -0.059 
(-9.840) 
𝑔1 0.295  
(21.814) 
𝑏1 -0.047   
(-1.734) 
𝑑c1 -0.1204 
(-13.647)   
𝑔1 0.238     
(26.463)   
𝑏1 -0.069 
 (-3.678)   
𝑑c2 -0.000 
(-0.056) 
𝑔2 -0.117       
(-8.310) 
𝑏2 -0.082     
(-2.951) 
𝑑c2 -0.012   
(-1.052)  
𝑔2 0.019      
(1.603)   
𝑏2 -0.177 
(-6.206)   
𝑑c3 -0.027 
(-4.301) 
𝑔3 1.171  
(3.196) 
𝑏3 -2.197     
(-3.711) 
𝑑c3 -0.023     
(-2.005)   
𝑔3 0.050      
(3.007)   
𝑏3 -0.040 
 (-1.295)   
𝑑f1 0.243 
(41.093) 
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
-0.460 
(-4.751) 
𝑔4 -0.091 
(-3.471) 
𝑑f1 0.364     
(39.037)   
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
1.800      
(4.547)   
𝑔4 -0.220 
(-3.773)   
𝜁 0.644 
(53.360) 
𝛾𝐹 
j = 8 
-0.370 
(-2.399) 
𝑔5 -0.014     
(-1.743) 
𝜁 0.047      
(5.245)   
𝛾𝐹 
j = 8 
1.974    
(1.811)   
𝑔5 -0.057 
 (-4.331)   
𝜆0 0.013 
(39.932) 
𝛾𝐻 
h = 8 
-6.425     
(-2.383) 
  𝜆0 -0.006     
(-1.628)   
𝛾𝐻 
h = 4 
1.267      
(2.244)   
  
𝜆1 1.000 
(12778.9) 
    𝜆1   1.006    
(148.414)   
    
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 0.986 
(3713.0) 
LLF -2427.50   𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 0.962  
(275.294)   
LLF -2724.74   
𝜔𝑐 0.681 
(47.488) 
𝜔𝑓 0.711     
(57.352) 
  𝜔𝑐 0.682    
(31.669)   
𝜔𝑓 0.474     
(30.543) 
  
𝛼𝑐 0.096    
(126.050) 
𝛼𝑓 0.091    
(98.641) 
  𝛼𝑐 0.107     
(58.611)   
𝛼𝑓 0.079     
(47.881)   
  
𝛽𝑐 0.853    
(827.629) 
𝛽𝑓 0.855    
(774.673) 
  𝛽𝑐 0.845    
(298.518)   
𝛽𝑓 0.877    
(257.354)   
  
T.N.T. 
 
7.124 
[0.000] 
C F H 
4.629 
[0.003] 
C 
8.201 
[0.000] 
F 
2.895 
[0.034] 
H 
T.N.T.  6.444 
[0.000] 
C F H 
4.220 
[0.006] 
C 
1.442 
[0.229] 
F 
14.373 
[0.000] 
H 
  
𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄          𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄      𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄   𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄    
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.080 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] -0.075  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.063 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] -0.056   
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.025 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.018  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.029 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.022   
Sk. -0.583 Sk. -0.489  Sk. -0.559 Sk. -0.490   
Kurt. 1.164 Kurt. 0.946  Kurt. 1.199 Kurt. 1.143   
ARCH1 0.084   
[0.772] 
ARCH1 0.214   
[0.644] 
 ARCH1 0.169 
 [0.681] 
ARCH1 0.055   
[0.814] 
  
ARCH2 1.843   
[0.398] 
ARCH2 1.168   
[0.557] 
 ARCH2 2.194    
[0.334] 
ARCH2 1.474   
[0.479] 
  
AR1 1.961   
[0.161] 
AR1 3.875   
[0.049] 
 AR1 1.172 
[0.279] 
AR1 1.424   
[0.234] 
  
AR2 
 
3.563   
[0.168] 
AR2 
 
5.207   
[0.074] 
 AR2 
 
3.445 
[ 0.179] 
AR2 4.043   
[0.132] 
  
JB 76.758 
[0.000] 
JB 52.154 
[0.000] 
 JB 76.169 
[0.000] 
JB 64.052 
[0.000] 
  
BDS2  0.3250 
 [0.745] 
 
BDS2  0.5336 
[0.594] 
  
 
 
 BDS2  0.2078 
[ 0.835] 
 
BDS2 -0.0832 
[0.934] 
  
  
 
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; Sk.: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; 
ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for 
k-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; T.N.T.: Teräsvirta (1994) test of nonlinearity applied to the 
chartists’ (C), fundamentalists’ (F) and hedgers’ (H) transition functions and to the three transition functions 
simultaneously (C F H). BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the standardized 
residuals are independently and identically distributed. 
 
Indeed the three LSTAR dynamics γ-coefficient are always positive and significant in 
the case of Fut-3 and negative in the case of Fut-1. Coefficient  
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𝑔4 estimates are negative for both contracts and capture the well-known negative 
impact of a USD appreciation on oil prices. The negative sign of the  
𝑔5 coefficient is more relevant and disproves the hypothesis that a greater stock 
market perception of risk resulted in an outflow of financial funds into commodity 
investment. Indeed, the opposite seems to have been the case, the latter occurring 
in spite of rise in financial market uncertainty.  
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphical assessment of the effects on futures returns of 
the different degree of consensus of chartists (left panel), fundamentalists (middle 
panel) and hedgers (right panel) with respect to deviations of price from perceived 
equilibrium and of trust in this perception. As discussed above, these deviations 
bring about an increase (decline) in the number of market participants, and thus in 
the absolute value of the impact on the futures rate of return, depending upon the 
positive (negative) sign of the estimated ϒ coefficient, the absolute value of which 
(i.e. degree of consensus) being reflected in the slope of the curves.12 The impact of 
the bubble is relevant and brings about a shift in the pattern of the graphs (see the 
dots in the circles) and corresponds - in response to a growing deviation of the rates 
of return from their normal values - to a decrease in the destabilizing behaviour of 
chartists and to an increase in the destabilizing behaviour of fundamentalists. The 
case of the hedgers is more complex, since they become stabilizers in the case of 
the Fut-1 contract only. 
 
                                                          
12
 Each graph contains a scatter plot of the impact of each group of agents on futures returns 
(regression coefficient multiplied by the value of the LSTAR transition function) and the deviations of 
the transition variable from its equilibrium value. We report the former on the vertical axis and the 
latter on the horizontal one. For the sake of clarity, we have interpolated the scatter plots using local 
first order polynomial regressions with bandwidth based on the nearest neighbor approach. The local 
regressions are performed on a sub sample selected according to the Cleveland (1993) procedure and 
involves about 100 evaluation points. Tricube weights are used in the weighted regressions used to 
minimize the weighted sum of squared residuals. The bandwidth span of each local regression is set to 
0.3. 
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Figure 2. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 1-month futures rates of 
return and deviations from long-term equilibrium  
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
-20 -10 0 10 20
N-rc(t-1-i)
im
p
a
c
t 
o
f 
c
h
a
rt
is
ts
 
-.10
-.09
-.08
-.07
-.06
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
M-rc(t-1-j)
im
p
a
c
t 
o
f 
fu
n
d
a
m
e
n
ta
lis
ts
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
M-rc(t-1-h)
im
p
a
c
t 
o
f 
h
e
d
g
e
rs
 
As shown in Figure 2, which applies to Fut-1 returns, the price destabilizing impact 
of chartists weakens during the bubble for any given deviation of futures returns 
from perceived normal values (left-panel). On the contrary, fundamentalists 
strongly destabilize the market during the bubble (mid-panel), overshadowing the 
price-moderating effect of hedging (right-panel).   
 
Figure 3. Impact of speculators and hedgers on 3-month futures rates of 
return and deviations from long-term equilibrium  
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Coming to Fut-3 returns, we obtain qualitatively analogous results (see Figure 3) in 
the case of chartists and fundamentalists, who both contribute to price 
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destabilization during the bubble. This effect is augmented but marginally by 
hedgers. 
3.2 Robustness analysis 
 
The inclusion of observations from the second 2009-2016 cycle, with its own specific 
characteristics, may introduce new factors that alter the behavioural reaction of the 
agents and affect our bubble investigation. In order to focus on the interpretation of 
the latter, we restrict the sample to the first cycle, which spans the 2 January 2003 
30 December 2009 time period, and we obtain surprisingly similar results. This 
finding suggests that our analysis identifies a specific thread of the oil price 
dynamics, over the 2007-2009 time interval, which is independent of the sample 
length. 
The quality of fit of the estimates set forth in Table 3 is highly satisfactory, all the 
coefficients are significant at the standard levels of significance and a perusal of the 
usual tests finds no evidence of model misspecification. Feedback traders and 
fundamentalists tend to destabilize prices since, for both contracts, coefficient 𝑔1 
and 𝑔2 estimates take, respectively, positive and negative values. Here too the 
bubble brings about differing results. Feedback traders become contrarians (𝑏1 is 
large and negative), a fact that may reflect their fear of impeding price collapse. On 
the other hand, the destabilizing behaviour of fundamentalists becomes more 
incisive (𝑏2 is large and negative). Hedgers, as in the full sample estimates, tend to 
stabilize prices during the bubble upswing, since coefficient 𝑏3 estimates are large 
and negative. As for the gamma estimates, the only difference between the full 
sample and first period estimates, is that feedback traders in the Fut-1 sub-market 
tend to trust price dynamics, and – the  𝛾𝐶  estimates being positive - enter the 
market for large deviations of current from equilibrium futures prices. 
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Table 3. Sub-sample estimates: 02/01/2003 – 30/12/2009 
Fut1 Fut3 
m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=2, h=8 m = 1, n = 3 i=0, j=0, h=9 
𝑟𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑐𝑡  𝑟𝑓𝑡 
𝑑0 2.754 
(81.619) 
𝑔0 0.596 
(18.212) 
  𝑑0 1.960 
(46.576) 
𝑔0 0.464 
(17.363) 
  
𝑑c1 0.071 
(9.116) 
𝑔1 0.082 
(8.185) 
𝑏1 -0.159 
(-9.450) 
𝑑c1 -0.114 
(-15.498) 
𝑔1 0.127 
(12.303) 
𝑏1 -0.038 
(-1.891) 
𝑑c2 -0.002 
(-0.161) 
𝑔2 -0.177 
(-9.949) 
𝑏2 -2.286 
(-9.916) 
𝑑c2 -0.018 
(-1.632) 
𝑔2 -0.121 
(-16.750) 
𝑏2 -0.090 
(-4.337) 
𝑑c3 -0.031 
(-3.042) 
𝑔3 0.804 
(2.996) 
𝑏3 -1.579 
(-3.679) 
𝑑c3 -0.046 
(-3.031) 
𝑔3 0.068 
(2.956) 
𝑏3 -0.136 
(-4.265) 
𝑑f1 0.075 
(9.603) 
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
0.844 
(1.667) 
𝑔4 -0.073 
(-2.132) 
𝑑f1 0.350 
(44.011) 
𝛾𝐶 
i = 0 
0.663 
(3.312) 
𝑔4 -0.307 
(-4.533) 
𝜁 0.885 
(58.523) 
𝛾𝐹 
j = 2 
-0.118 
(-1.64) 
𝑔5 -0.036 
(-2.991) 
𝜁 0.070 
(76.405) 
𝛾𝐹 
j = 8 
2.534 
(2.406) 
𝑔5 -0.073 
(-3.031) 
𝜆0 0.012 
(31.928) 
𝛾𝐻 
h = 8 
-2.076 
(-2.375) 
  𝜆0 0.042 
(18.850) 
𝛾𝐻 
h = 4 
0.891 
(21.560) 
  
𝜆1 1.003 
(10447) 
    𝜆1 1.044 
(242.507) 
    
𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 0.985 
(2473.20) 
LLF -1398.36   𝜌𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑓 0.956 
(225.045) 
LLF -1555.82   
𝜔𝑐 0.763 
(29.836) 
𝜔𝑓 0.915 
(32.406) 
  𝜔𝑐 0.674 
(46.147) 
𝜔𝑓 0.506 
(10.315) 
  
𝛼𝑐 0.119 
(103.096) 
𝛼𝑓 0.125 
(82.551) 
  𝛼𝑐 0.130 
(34.922) 
𝛼𝑓 0.091 
(30.147) 
  
𝛽𝑐 0.838 
(585.933) 
𝛽𝑓 0.823 
(452.889) 
  𝛽𝑐 0.833 
(239.087) 
𝛽𝑓 0.868 
(156.270) 
  
T.N.T. 
 
6.683 
[0.000] 
C F H 
5.512 
[0.001] 
C 
6.962 
[0.000] 
F 
3.677 
[0.012] 
H 
T.N.T.  3.553 
[0.000] 
C F H 
0.978 
[0.403] 
C 
2.232 
[0.084] 
F 
5.365 
[0.001] 
H 
 
𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄          𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄      𝜂𝑐𝑡 = 𝜈𝑐𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑐𝑡
2⁄   𝜂𝑓𝑡 = 𝜈𝑓𝑡 √ℎ𝑟𝑓𝑡
2⁄    
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.084 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] -0.084  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡] -0.061 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡] -0.056   
𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.003 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.004  𝐸[𝜂𝑐𝑡
2 ] 1.028 𝐸[𝜂𝑓𝑡
2 ] 1.032   
Sk. -0.693 Sk. -0.569  Sk. -0.687 Sk. -0.538   
Kurt. 0.720 Kurt. 0.319  Kurt. 0.794 Kurt. 0.358   
ARCH1 0.257 
[0.612] 
ARCH1 0.488 
[0.485] 
 ARCH1 0.810 
[0.368] 
ARCH1 0.106 
[0.745] 
  
ARCH2 1.377 
[0.502] 
ARCH2 0.621 
[0.733] 
 ARCH2 2.185 
[0.335] 
ARCH2 0.336 
[0.845] 
  
AR1 2.314 
[0.128] 
AR1 3.558 
[0.059] 
 AR1 0.684 
[0.408] 
AR1 0.795 
[0.372] 
  
AR2 
 
3.292 
[0.193] 
AR2 
 
4.778 
[0.091] 
 AR2 
 
2.536 
[0.281] 
AR2 3.525 
[0.172] 
  
JB 37.8122 
[0.000] 
JB 21.233 
[0.000] 
 JB 38.294 
[0.000] 
JB 19.596 
[0.000] 
  
BDS2 -0.4635 
[0.643] 
 
BDS2 -0.0522 
 [0.958] 
 
 BDS2 -0.8707 
[0.384] 
  
BDS2 -0.9519 
[0.341] 
  
  
Notes. Probability values in square brackets; Sk.: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; 
ARk: Ljung-Box test statistic for k-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCHk: Ljung-Box test statistic for 
k-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; T.N.T.: Teräsvirta (1994) test of nonlinearity applied to the 
chartists’ (C), fundamentalists’ (F) and hedgers’ (H) transition functions and to the three transition functions 
simultaneously (C F H). BDSk: test statistic, with embedding dimension k, of the null that the standardized 
residuals are independently and identically distributed. 
 
The strong similarity of the full sample and first period results is also conducive to 
the conclusion that the financialisation of the oil market is a permanent, irreversible 
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phenomenon. The extension of the investigation to the second 2009 - 2016 cycle 
fails to weaken the quality of the system’s fit and does not alter its economic 
interpretation, the signs of the coefficients being almost always unchanged.  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
A recent and growing literature explains the bubble that characterized oil prices 
between 2007 and 2009 as the result of utility maximization by rational 
heterogeneous agents, interacting and possibly influencing each other. In this 
paper, we combine this approach with the HAM models of Westerhoff and Reitz and 
the LPPL model of Johansen et al. (2000), which combines a super-exponential 
pattern with bouts of negative feedback loops of price collapse. More precisely, our 
analysis, based on a flexible three-agent model, which controls also for exchange 
rate and equity market risk perception, attributes the bubble mostly to the 
destabilizing behaviour of fundamentalist speculators. Among these we include 
institutional investors, ETFs and hedge funds, as conventionally done in the 
literature. This reaction reinforces the standard price destabilizing effect caused by 
chartists. The extension of the sample to the post-bubble period (2009 – 2016)  
does not seem to invalidate our financial interpretation in spite of sharp and 
unexpected fluctuations in oil prices and a significant increase in the influence of 
geopolitical factors. Indeed, speculation plays a clear-cut destabilizing role over the 
entire sample period, due to the joint reaction of chartists and fundamentalists. Our 
results are thus in line with Zhang et al. (2017) among others.  
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Appendix on statistical bubble detection 
D-test of “super exponential” growth price behaviour (Zhou and Sornette, 2009) 
Let 𝐷 =
(𝑅𝑀𝑆1−𝑅𝑀𝑆2)
𝑅𝑀𝑆1
 be a relative goodness of fit statistic 
where 𝑅𝑀𝑆1 and 𝑅𝑀𝑆2 denote the root-mean-square of the residuals of the following 
(log) price equation estimates 
log (𝑝𝑡 ) = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                 (A.1) 
log (𝑝𝑡 ) = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                          (A.2) 
(A.1) is the standard geometric random walk and coincides with (A.2), if the null 
c=0 holds. For c>0, (A.2) parameterizes a price process growing super 
exponentially. The D statistic measures the relative difference of the improvement 
of the fits resulting from the additional quadratic term in (A.2). The larger is D the 
more probable is the rejection of the null c=0 and the relevance of the quadratic 
term, i.e. of the bubble model. Zhou and Sornette (2009, p. 872) suggest that the 
time series is not in a bubble regime if (1) D≤ 0.25, or (2) c is not positive. Over the 
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time periods set out in the table below the values of the D-test statistics are 
supportive of a super-exponential (Fut-1 and Fut-3 price) behaviour.  
Time period 1 December  2006 - 
28 June 2008 
12 January  2007 - 
13 February 2009 
1 January 2007 – 
31 October 2008 
1 January 2006 – 
1 May 2008 
D-statistic Fut-1 0.1781 0.7559 0.7146 0.3916 
D-statistic Fut-3 0.2739 0.6649 0.1396 0.3711 
 
 
SADF test (Phillips et al., 2011) of explosive behaviour (bubble) identification 
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Notes. Critical values obtained using a Montecarlo simulation with 1000 replications, initial window of 54 
observations and null model 𝑥𝑡 =  𝑑𝑇
−𝜀 + 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡, where it is assumed that d=1 and ԑ=1.  
 
Phillips et al. (2011) propose comparing each element of the estimated right-tail 
rolling ADF sequence to the corresponding right-tailed critical values of the standard 
ADF statistic to identify a bubble initiating at time T. The estimated origination point 
of a bubble is the first chronological observation, denoted by Tre , in which ADFr 
crosses the corresponding critical value from below, while the estimated termination 
point is the first chronological observation after Tre , denoted by Trf , in which ADFr 
crosses the critical value from above. Formally, the estimates of the bubble period 
(as fractions of the sample) are defined by 
re = inf (r : ADFr > 𝑐𝑣𝑟
𝛽𝑡) 
r∈[r0,1] 
rf = inf (r : ADFr < 𝑐𝑣𝑟
𝛽𝑡)  
r∈[re,1] 
where 𝑐𝑣𝑟
𝛽𝑡  is the 100(1 − 𝛽𝑡 )% critical value of the standard ADF statistic based on 
[Tr ]  observations (see Caspi, 2017, p. 7, for more details). Both graphs suggest 
that the SADF statistics exceed the right-tail ADF critical values, rejecting thus the 
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null of unit root in favour of the explosive alternative, from the beginning of 2007 to 
the end of 2008, and corroborate in this way our bubble timing hypothesis. 
 
 
